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I. INTRODUCTION
In a country wrought with governmental corruption, citizens
who protested the government kept disappearing and were never
found. The government's refusal to investigate led many
outraged citizens to believe that the government was murdering
political activists. Adding to the citizen's revulsion, the
government repeatedly raised the bus fares-an expense that
already constituted an enormous portion the citizens' annual
living expense-thereby making it difficult for the citizens to
assemble. The government's suspected criminal and oppressive
behavior ultimately sparked protests by many student groups,
one of which set empty government-owned buses on fire and
trashed stores. These acts finally succeeded in drawing a
response from the government via television broadcasts. Soon,
however, the student leaders began receiving death threats
similar to those received by the previous activists who had
disappeared. One student leader, fearing for his life, fled to the
United States where he later learned that several other leaders
had been killed. Having entered the United States without
inspection, he faced deportation back to his home country unless
he could convince the U.S. government that his demonstrations
were political crimes.'
In a different country, a political group worked to further its
goals of social amelioration. A faction of that group, however,
grew to despise their peaceful methods and thus broke off into a
clandestine terrorist group which recognized only itself as the
source of law and order. Funded by thousands of armed
robberies, they bombed both civilian and government institutions
and murdered those who disagreed with them. Even the ranks of
the organization were violent; discipline meant crushing the
knees of members or murdering them. One long-time member
failed to kidnap an American for ransom. Fearing the group's
discipline, he forged a visa and entered the United States. Due
to his crimes and fraudulent entry, he faced deportation unless
he could convince the U.S. government that his terrorist acts
were political crimes.2
1. These are essentially the facts of Immigration & Naturalization Service v.
Aguirre-Aguirre, 121 F.3d 521 (9th Cir. 1997), rev'd 119 S.Ct. 1439 (1999).
2. These are essentially the facts of McMullen v.INS, 788 F.2d 776 (9th Cir. 1986).
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Comparison of these two drastically different situations
demonstrates the need for a clear political crime standard that
can distinguish between aliens deserving protection and common
criminals. A clear political crime standard would also prevent
the Attorney General from having to make the determination
completely based on diplomatic considerations.
Recently, the Supreme Court decided INS v. Aguirre-
Aguirre,3 an appeal from a Ninth Circuit decision addressing the
political crime standard promulgated by the Board of
Immigration Appeals (BIA) for purposes of the "serious non-
political crime" exception to withholding of deportation.4 The
facts of Aguirre-Aguirre were those described in the first scenario
above. Aguirre-Aguirre, the student leader, had testified before
an Immigration Judge that his crimes against the Guatemalan
government were political crimes and that if returned to
Guatemala he would face death or persecution because of his
acts.' The Immigration Judge wholly believed Aguirre-Aguirre
and withheld his deportation.6  The Board of Immigration
Appeals (BIA) reversed, however, holding that Aguirre-Aguirre's
acts were not political crimes because their criminal nature
"outweigh[ed] their political nature."'
Presented with only this vague political crime standard, the
Ninth Circuit reversed the BIA, finding that the BIA should have
considered the character of Aguirre-Aguirre's crimes in relation
to his political objectives and balanced the severity of his crime
with the persecution feared.' "Aguirre could well be found to be
in danger of losing his life if returned to Guatemala and therefore
should be excluded for his crimes only for the most serious
reasons. " 9 Accordingly, the Ninth Circuit remanded the case.lO
3. 121 F.3d 521 (9th Cir. 1997), rev'd 119 S.Ct. 1439 (1999).
4. See Immigration and Nationality Act § 241, 8 U.S.C. § 1231(b)(3)(B)(iii) (1998)
[hereinafter INA]. In 1996, Congress rewrote several sections of the Immigration and
Nationality Act. One revision was the substitution of the term "removal" for
"deportation." For consistency with the cases, this case note will continue to use the term
"deportation."
5. See Aguirre-Aguirre, 121 F.3d at 522.
6. See id.
7. Id. (quoting the unpublished BIA decision).
8. See id. at 523-24.
9. Id. at 524 (citing GuY S. GOODWIN-GILL, THE REFUGEE IN INTERNATIONAL LAW
107 (2nd ed. 1996) (internal quotation marks omitted).
10. There is a difference in remedies among the Second and Ninth Circuits where
the courts "conclude that the BIA's denial of a request for asylum and withholding of
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The Supreme Court rejected the Ninth Circuit's clarifications
due to the principles of Chevron deference." Potential
"diplomatic repercussions" arising from a determination by the
Attorney General that a violent offense committed in another
country is a political crime prevented the Court from expounding
on the BIA's standard. 12
The Aguirre-Aguirre decision evidences the need for the BIA
to clarify its political crime standard. This article will address
the Ninth Circuit's attempt to require the political nature of a
crime to be determined from the perspective of the country in
which it was committed. 13 This article will also discuss the Ninth
Circuit's attempt to reintroduce a balancing test which weighs
the severity of the crime against the degree of persecution feared.
The previous rejection of this test was premised on a false
conflict between protecting the U.S. populace from criminals or
protecting the aliens from persecution. This article will highlight
this false conflict because proper application of the "serious non-
political crime" exception is frequently dispositive of an alien's
entire application to remain in the United States. 4
deportation was based on the application of an incorrect standard." Dwomoh U. Sava, 696
F. Supp. 970, 980 (S.D.N.Y. 1988). The Second Circuit remands the case because "it is the
responsibility of the immigration judge and the BIA to assess the proof in light of the
correct test." Id. (citing Brice v. United States Dep't of Justice, 806 F.2d 415, 418 (2d Cir.
1986); Carcamo-Flores v. INS, 805 F.2d 60, 68 (2d Cir. 1986)). The Ninth Circuit,
however, may first "establish... eligibility for asylum," and then "remand0 for the
discretionary grant or denial of asylum," and for a determination of eligibility for
withholding of deportation. Id. at 980 n.13 (citing Desir v. llchert, 840 F.2d 723, 729 (9th
Cir. 1988); Bolanos-Hernandez v. INS, 767 F.2d 1277, 1288 (9th Cir. 1984); Damaize-Job
v. INS, 787 F.2d 1332, 1338 (9th Cir. 1986); Del Valle v. INS, 776 F.2d 1407, 1409, 1414
(9th Cir. 1985)) (parentheticals omitted).
11. See Aguirre-Aguirre, 119 S.Ct. at 1445 (citing Chevron US.A., Inc. v. Natural
Resources Defense Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 842 (1984)).
12. See id.
13. See Aguirre-Aguirre, 121 F.3d at 523-24.
14. For instance, if the INS believes this exception applies to an alien, then "the
government is not required to give [the] alien an asylum hearing." In re Extradition of
Sandhu, 886 F. Supp. 318, 323 n.6 (S.D.N.Y. 1993) (citing Azzouka v. Sava, 777 F.2d 68,
73 (2d Cir. 1985)). This result was codified in 1996 when Congress created similar
"particularly serious crime" and "serious non-political crime" exceptions to the asylum
provisions, thereby revoking the Attorney General's discretionary authority in those
contexts. See Immigration and Nationality Act § 208, 8 U.S.C. §§ 1158(b)(2)(A)(ii)-(iii)
(1998). Prior to this codification, both the BIA and the Eleventh Circuit rejected the
"practice of pretermitting asylum applications in cases involving aliens convicted of
particularly serious crimes." In re Gonzalez, 19 1. & N. Dec. 682, 685 (B.I.A. 1988) (citing
Arauz v. Rivkind, 845 F.2d 271 (11th Cir. 1988)).
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Part II will begin by describing the legal context in which
Aguirre-Aguirre was decided including the sources of the "serious
non-political crime" exception and the development of the
political crime standard. Part III will then discuss the
advantages of the home country perspective and explain the
proper application of the balancing test. The article concludes in
Part IV, that, although not binding on the BIA, the Ninth
Circuit's refinements of the political crime standard are best able
to handle problematic issues that will arise. While this article
discusses the proper application of an existing remedy available
to criminal aliens, it does not argue that additional protection is
needed or that Aguirre-Aguirre's crimes are valid political
crimes.
II. LEGAL CONTEXT
A. Federal Law
The Immigration and Nationality Act15 (INA) allows aliens
who are physically present in the United States, and threatened
with persecution on the grounds of race, religion, nationality,
group affiliation, or political opinion, to seek protection under
federal law by filing either an application for asylum,16
withholding of deportation," or both.18
15. Immigration and Nationality Act, Pub. L. No. 82-414, 66 Stat. 163 (1952), 8
U.S.C. §§ 1101-1503 (1998).
16. See id. 8 U.S.C. § 1158.
17. See id. 8 U.S.C. § 1231.
18. Under certain circumstances, an application for asylum will also be regarded as
an application for withholding of deportation. See 8 C.F.R. § 208.3(b) (1998).
Although "completely separate," both asylum and withholding of deportation
"are designed to provide relief to aliens who fear political persecution in their native
countries." Young v. INS, 759 F.2d 450, 455 (5th Cir. 1985). Withholding of deportation,
however, is a much narrower remedy than asylum. See e.g., Mosquera-Perez v. INS, 3
F.3d 553, 554 n.3 (1st Cir. 1993). For instance, the alien's burden of proof is more
stringent for withholding than asylum. See INS v. Cardoza-Fonseca, 480 U.S. 421, 430-
31 (1987). Additionally, asylum only requires a well-founded fear of persecution, but
withholding requires a clear probability of persecution, meaning "more likely than not."
INS v. Stevic, 467 U.S. 407, 424 (1984).
The alien's future in the United States also differs between the two remedies.
"Withholding of deportation is 'country-specific,' in the sense that deportation to a
hospitable' country is not precluded." Mosquera-Perez, 3 F.3d at 554. Only "an alien
granted asylum may become a lawful permanent resident." Id.
Despite its disadvantages, the withholding remedy is advantageous due to the
1999] 689
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Regarding withholding of deportation, the INA provides:
[T]he Attorney General may not remove an alien to a country
if the Attorney General decides that the alien's life or freedom
would be threatened in that country because of the alien's
race, religion, nationality, membership in a particular social
group, or political opinion.' 9
"An alien who meets this standard of eligibility, and who does not
fall under a statutory exception, is entitled to withholding of
deportation ... .""
One of the five statutory exceptions to this entitlement
denies withholding of deportation to aliens who have committed
a "serious non-political crime" outside the United States prior to
their arrival.2
B. International Agreements
1. The Convention and Protocol
The international community responded to the growing
refugee problem by assuming responsibility for, protecting, and
assisting refugees.22 It was at this time that the United Nations
drafted the Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees" and
the Protocol Relating to the Status of Refugees24 which determine
mandatory language added by the Refugee Act of 1980. See Carvajal-Munoz v. INS, 743
F.2d 562, 568 (7th Cir. 1984) ("Prior to the passage of the Refugee Act, the withholding of
deportation was at the discretion of the Attorney General."). Whereas "the Attorney
General may grant asylum," Immigration and Nationality Act § 208(b)(1), 8 U.S.C. §
1158(b)(1) (1998) (emphasis added), "the Attorney General may not remove an alien to a
country if the Attorney General decides that the alien's life or freedom would be
threatened in that country." Id. § 241(b)(3)(A), 8 U.S.C. § 1231(b)(3)(A) (1998) (emphasis
added).
19. Immigration and Nationality Act § 241(b)(3)(A).
20. Choeum v. INS, 129 F.3d 29, 40 (1st Cir. 1997) (citing INS v. Cardoza-Fonseca,
480 U.S. 421, 429 (1987).
21. See 8 U.S.C. § 1231(b)(3)(B)(iii) (1998).
22. See UNITED NATIONS HIGH COMMISSIONER FOR REFUGEES, HANDBOOK ON
PROCEDURES AND CRITERIA FOR DETERMINING REFUGEE STATUS UNDER THE 1951
CONVENTION AND THE 1967 PROTOCOL RELATING TO THE STATUS OF REFUGES 1 (Geneva
1979) revised by U.N. Doc. HCR/IP/4/Eng/Rev.1 (Geneva 1992) [hereinafter Handbook].
23. Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees of 28 July 1951, entered into force
April 22, 1954, 606 U.N.T.S. 268 [hereinafter Convention].
24. Protocol Relating to the Status of Refugees of 31 January 1967, entered into force
October 4, 1967, 19 U.S.T. 6223, 606 U.N.T.S. 267 [hereinafter Protocol].
[Vol. 30:3690
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"the legal status of refugees."25  These agreements define a
"refugee" as any person who,
owing to a well-founded fear of being persecuted for reasons of
race, religion, nationality, membership of a particular social
group or political opinion, is outside the country of his
nationality and is unable or, owing to such fear, is unwilling
to avail himself of the protection of that country; or who, not
having a nationality and being outside the country of his
former habitual residence as a result of such events, is unable
or, owing to such fear, is unwilling to return to it.'6
By acceding to the Protocol in 1968,27 the United States
agreed "to comply with the substantive provisions ... of the
[Convention]."8
Although the Convention and Protocol define "refugee,"
neither agreement requires the contracting states to grant
asylum to refugees.29 Nonetheless, the Convention and Protocol
do prohibit the expulsion of a refugee to territories where his life
or freedom would be threatened on account of his race, religion,
nationality, group affiliation, or political opinion."0  This
prohibition is "a crucial one in refugee law, and adherence to it
by states is considered essential for the protection of refugees."3'
Similar to the INA, the Convention denies this protection to
aliens guilty of serious non-political crimes committed abroad.3
25. Handbook, supra note 22, 5.
26. Convention, supra note 23, art. l(A)(2), 606 U.N.T.S. at 268; Protocol, supra note
24, art. 1(2), 19 U.S.T. at 6223, 606 U.N.T.S. at 267. Due to "the passage of time and
emergence of new refugee situations," the Protocol made the Convention applicable to all
refugees by eliminating the Convention's requirement that the well-founded fear be "a
result of events occurring before 1 January 1951." Handbook, supra note 22, 8. See also
Convention, supra note 23, art. l(A)(2), 606 U.N.T.S. at 268; Protocol, supra note 24,
pmbl., 19 U.S.T. at 6223, 606 U.N.T.S. at 267.
27. The United States became a party to the protocol by accession on November 1,
1968. See Protocol, supra note 24, app., 19 U.S.T. at 6223, 606 U.N.T.S. at 267.
28. INS v. Stevic, 467 U.S. 407, 416 (1984). See also Protocol, supra note 24, art.
1(1), 606 U.N.T.S. at 268.
29. See infra note 38.
30. See Convention, supra note 23, art. 33(1), 606 U.N.T.S. at 268; Protocol, supra
note 24, art. 1(1), 19 U.S.T. at 6223, 606 U.N.T.S. at 267 ("The States Parties...
undertake to apply Articles 2 to 34 inclusive of the Convention.").
31. Evangeline G. Abriel, Presumed Ineligible: The Effect of Criminal Convictions on
Applications or Asylum and Withholding of Deportation Under Section 515 of the
Immigration Act of 1990, 6 GEO. IMMIGR. L.J. 27, 31 (1992).
32. See Convention, supra note 23, art. 1(F)(b), 606 U.N.T.S. at 268.
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This exception does not apply to "particularly serious crimes"
committed inside the host country, however. 3
2. The Handbook
The United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees
(UNHCR) provides international protection to refugees under the
guidance of the United Nations.34 The UNHCR was established
by the United Nations General Assembly precisely to supervise
the application of "international conventions for the protection of
refugees."35  In fulfilling this duty, the UNHCR issued the
Handbook on Procedures and Criteria for Determining Refugee
Status Under the 1951 Convention and the 1967 Protocol
Relating to the Status of Refugees as a guide for the practice of
refugee law."
By acceding to the Protocol, the United States agreed "to co-
operate with the [UNHCR ... in the exercise of its functions"
and to "facilitate its duty of supervising the application of the
provisions of the present Protocol. 7  The U.S. Supreme Court
has held that even in circumstances where the Handbook
expressly disclaims the force of law," "the Handbook provides
significant guidance in construing the Protocol, to which
Congress sought to conform." ' Thus, although the Handbook is
33. See id. at art. 33(2), 606 U.N.T.S. at 268. That the "particular serious crime"
exception applies only to crimes committed inside the host country is evidenced by the
requirement that the alien be convicted by a "final judgment," proof of which is easily
obtainable within the host country. The exception for "serious non-political crimes"
committed outside the host country does not require formal proof of previous foreign penal
prosecution, which may not be obtainable. See Handbook, supra note 22, 149. This
exception only requires "serious reasons for considering" that the alien is guilty.
34. See Statute of the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees,
G.A. Res. 428(V), U.N. SCHR, 5th Sess., ch. 1(1), U.N. Doc. ST/HR (1950).
35. Id. ch. 8(a).
36. See Handbook, supra note 22, Foreword (IV)-(V).
37. Protocol, supra note 24, art. 2, 19 U.S.T. at 6223, 606 U.N.T.S. at 267. The
Convention contains identical language except the term "Convention" is used instead of
"Protocol." See Convention, supra note 23, art. 35(1), 606 U.N.T.S. at 268. Additionally,
the Statute of the High Commissioner's Office adopted by the General Assembly also
requires "co-operation between Governments and the High Commissioner's Office in
dealing with refugee problems." Handbook, supra note 22, 18.
38. The Handbook does not "bind] the INS with reference to the asylum provisions"
of the INA because "the determination of refugee status under the 1951 Convention and
1967 Protocol" is left to the contracting states. INS v. Cardoza-Fonseca, 480 U.S. 421, 439
n.22 (1987) (citing Handbook, supra note 22, Foreword (II)).
39. Id. See also Hernandez-Ortiz v. INS, 777 F.2d 509, 514 n.3 (9th Cir. 1985) ("The
[Vol. 30:3
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not binding upon the BIA or the courts, it is "an authoritative
commentary on the Convention and Protocol" and as such is due
great deference in withholding of deportation decisions.'
C. Construction of the "Serious Non-political
Crime" Standard
1. "Serious" Defined
The INA, Convention, and Protocol are all silent on what
constitutes a "serious" crime. Courts have therefore looked to
factors such as "the alien's description of the crime, the
turpitudinous nature of the crime according to our precedents,
the value of any property involved, the length of sentence
imposed and served, and the usual punishments imposed for
comparable offenses in the United States." "Heinous" crimes
such as murder are easy cases." Courts have distinguished
between crimes against property versus crimes against persons,
the latter being more serious."
The Handbook acknowledges that it is difficult to define
serious non-political crimes. "[F]or the purposes of this exclusion
clause," the Handbook states, "a 'serious' crime must be a capital
crime or a very grave punishable act." Thus the Handbook
balances the nature of the offense with the degree of persecution
such that "a crime must be very grave in order to exclude" the
alien.4
The BIA, however, has rejected "any interpretation of the
phrase[] 'serious nonpolitical crime'.. . which would vary with
Handbook contains standards for interpreting the United Nations Protocol Relating to the
Status of Refugees,... to which the United States acceded... , and which informed
Congress' actions when it passed the Refugee Act in 1980.").
40. Aguirre-Aguirre v. INS, 121 F.3d 521, 523 (9th Cir. 1997).
41. In re Ballester-Garcia, 17 I. & N. Dec. 592, 595 (B.I.A. 1980). See also In re
Frentescu, 18 I. & N. Dec. 244, 247 (B.I.A. 1982) (defining a "particularly serious" crime).
42. The United States District Court for the District of New Jersey held, "Murder is
so grave as to warrant extradition" even though the Handbook "admoni[shes that 'the
exclusion clauses should be applied in a restrictive manner.'" In re Extradition of Singh,
1988 WL 151438, 19 (D.N.J.) (quoting Handbook, supra note 22, 1 180).
43. See In re Frentescu, 18 I. & N. Dec. 244, 247 (B.I.A. 1982) ("Crimes against
persons are more likely to be categorized as 'particularly serious crimes.'").
44. Handbook, supra note 22, 155.
45. Id.
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the nature of the evidence of persecution. " 6 Partially relying on
the BIA's reasoning, the Ninth Circuit also previously rejected
the balancing test. 7 The only other circuit to address the issue is
the Eleventh Circuit. 8 In a short footnote, the Eleventh Circuit
rejected the argument that a stay of exclusionary proceedings is
proper when there has not yet been an opportunity to balance the
degree of persecution feared against the nature of the alien's past
crimes.49 This was a "mistaken belief," the Eleventh Circuit held,
as "both this court and the INS have previously rejected this
balancing test."'
2. "Non-political" Defined
Nowhere has the BIA clearly articulated its standard for
political crimes. The standard for which the Supreme Court
required deference in Aguirre-Aguirre was extracted from the
following statement by the BIA in In re McMullen:
In evaluating the political nature of a crime, we consider it
important that the political aspect of the offense outweigh its
common-law character. This would not be the case if the
crime is grossly out of proportion to the political objective or if
it involves acts of an atrocious nature."'
The Supreme Court explained that this test is comprised of "a
general standard (whether the political aspect of an offense
outweighs its common-law character) and then provides two
more specific inquiries that may be used in applying the rule:
whether there is a gross disproportion between means and ends,
and whether atrocious acts are involved." 2 Despite the Court's
attempt to characterize the BIA's standard as a clear standard,
46. In re Rodriguez-Coto, 19 I. & N. Dec. 208 (B.I.A. 1985).
47. See Ramirez-Ramos v. INS, 814 F.2d 1394, 1398 (9th Cir. 1987).
48. See Garcia-Mir v. Smith, 766 F.2d 1478 n.10 (11th Cir. 1985).
49. See id.
50. Id. (citing Fernandez-Roque v. Smith, No. 84-8993 slip op. (11th Cir. Jan. 24,
1985); In re Rodriguez-Coto, 19 I. & N. Dec. 208 (B.I.A. 1985)). Although the court refers
to "past criminal activity," it is unclear whether the court rejected the balancing test as it
applied to the exception for serious non-political crimes committed abroad or the
exception for particularly serious crimes committed in the host country because the
crimes could have been committed in the United States during the five year period
between the alien's arrival and the Eleventh Circuit's decision. See id. at 1478, 1480,
1487 n. 10.
51. In re McMullen, 19 I. & N. Dec. 90 (B.I.A. 1984).
52. INS v. Aguirre-Aguirre, 119 S.Ct. 1439, 1448 (1999).
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the Court grappled with other inquiries that the Attorney
General "suggested" may be relevant such as whether "there is a
close and direct causal link between the crime committed and its
alleged political purpose and object." 3
It was under this confusion that the Ninth Circuit, in
McMullen v. INS,54 first analyzed the BIA's political crime
standard for its consistency with both the Convention and
congressional intent. The Ninth Circuit elaborated on the BIA's
standard and stated it as a four-part test: (1) the alien must have
been motivated by political reasons; (2) the alien must have had
a political objective; (2) there must have been a close and direct
causal link between the crime committed and its alleged political
purpose and object; (4) the crime must be proportional to the
political objective.5  Based on this understanding of the
standard, the Ninth Circuit affirmed the BIA's decision and held
that it better recognizes "crimes that have both common law
criminal aspects and political aspects.""
Applying this standard to McMullen, the Ninth Circuit held
that his crimes were "beyond the pale of a protectable political
offense" because "indiscriminate bombing campaigns, murder,
torture, and the maiming of innocent civilians" are crimes that
are barbarous, atrocious, and "not sufficiently linked to their
political objective." 7
Since its decision in In re McMullen, the BIA has made no
further attempts to clarify its standard, although it has held,
inter alia, that burglary of a clothing store is "clearly
nonpolitical." 8 The precedential value of cases applying (but not
elaborating on) this standard is limited because "[w]hether
crimes are of a political character is primarily a question of
53. Id. at 1449.
54. 788 F.2d 591 (9th Cir. 1986).
55. See id. at 597. The court rejected McMullen's argument that an act is
"considered a political offense when (1) there was an insurrection or rebellion at the time
the criminal acts were committed, and (2) the criminal acts were incident to or in
furtherance of that rebellion." Id. at 596. "This formulation is consistent with the
traditional definition of a political offense for extradition purposes." Id.
56. Id. at 596. Unlike "pure" political crimes "such as sedition, treason, and
espionage," "relative" political crimes have both common law and criminal aspects. Id.
(citing Eain v. Wilkes, 641 F.2d 504, 512 (7th Cir. 1981)).
57. McMullen, 788 F.2d at 597-98 (internal quotation marks omitted).
58. In re Doural, 18 I. & N. Dec. 37, 38 (B.I.A. 1981).
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fact."59 In dictum, the Ninth Circuit has enumerated "arson,
murder, and armed robbery" as "clearly the sort of crimes
contemplated by the Convention as both 'serious' and
'nonpolitical."'0
III. ANALYSIS
Federal refugee law lacks a clear political crime standard.
Although the Supreme Court has now ruled that the vague
standard set forth by the BIA in McMullen is consistent with the
INA,"' the BIA's standard too general to be useful. Until clarified
by the BIA, any BIA decisions in this regard are virtually
unappealable because the courts have been signaled not to make
a detailed analysis or risk violating Chevron principles.62
The relevant concern arising from admitting criminal aliens
being criminal recidivism within the United States, a clear
political crime standard is critical for distinguishing between
political criminals and common criminals. Political criminals are
not likely to repeat their crimes in the United States because,
here, there are peaceful means to petition the government. Such
persons will not be forced to resort to crime as their only means
to end governmental injustices.
The Ninth Circuit's decisions in McMullen v. INS and
Aguirre-Aguirre v. INS may no longer be of precedential value,
but the Circuit's attempts to focus the standard can offer
guidance for the BIA's future development of a more useable
standard. Of the refinements to the standard made by the Ninth
Circuit, two are of the particular importance because they
address issues otherwise unresolved by the BIA's standard. The
first refinement is that the political nature of a crime must be
determined from the perspective of the country in which it was
committed. This clarification makes the standard more
applicable to cases where the political versus common-law
aspects of the crime are less clear. The second refinement is the
proper application of the balancing test. When applied to non-
59. In re McMullen, 19 I. & N. Dec. 90 (B.I.A. 1984).
60. McMullen, 788 F.2d at 597 (citing GUY S. GOODWIN-GILL, THE REFUGEE IN
INTERNATIONAL LAW 58-65 (1983)).
61. See INS v. Aguirre-Aguirre, 119 S.Ct. 1439, 1446 (1999).
62. See id.
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political crimes, the use of the balancing test brings federal
refugee law into accord with the Convention and Protocol.
A. Home Country Perspective
The political nature of a crime must be determined from the
perspective of the country in which it was committed. This is
because political crimes are a function of the political
environment in which they are committed. This principle has
long been recognized in extradition law where the "incidence
test" requires a determination of whether "there was an
insurrection or rebellion at the time the criminal act was
committed."'
Although the home country perspective has an effect on all
four elements of the Ninth Circuit's statement of the political
crime standard (motive, objective, causation, and
proportionality), it especially affects the proportionality element.
Under the proportionality test, a crime is analyzed for antisocial
behavior that cannot be attributed solely to the alien's political
motives. This would indicate that the alien committed a common
crime and thus presents a higher recidivism risk.
The difficulty with the BIA's vague proportionality standard
(which merely requires that the crime not be grossly
disproportionate to the political objective) is its manipulability.
The result is primarily dependent upon how the court
characterizes the crime and what the court believes were the
alien's motives. In some ways, applying this test can essentially
amount to the court's second-guessing the alien's choice of crime.
Aguirre-Aguirre presents an example of how crimes can be
manipulated to achieve the desired result. The Ninth Circuit
majority characterized Aguirre-Aguirre's crimes as "crimes
against property (the burning of the buses and the throwing of
store merchandise on the floor) and minor assaults and batteries
(the means taken to get reluctant bus passengers off the buses
before their destruction)."64 The dissent, however, characterized
63. McMullen v. INS, 788 F.2d 591, 596 (9th Cir. 1986). In an 1890 extradition case,
the Queen's Bench defined a political offense as one that: (1) occurs during an
insurrection or rebellion, and (2) is incident to or in furtherance of that insurrection or
rebellion. See In re Castioni, 1 Q.B. 149, 155-56 (1890).
64. Aguirre-Aguirre, 121 F.3d at 523.
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these same crimes very differently. What the majority called
crimes against property, the dissent called crimes against people
(the shopkeepers). 65 What the majority called minor assaults and
batteries, the dissent characterized as beating people with
baseball bats and stoning them with bricks.66
The danger in defining political crimes categorically based
solely upon their common law traits is also evident in Aguirre-
Aguirre. In a prior case, the Ninth Circuit stated in dictum that
"arson, murder, and armed robbery... are clearly the sort of
crimes contemplated by the Convention as . . 'nonpolitical.'
67
Aguirre-Aguirre, however, presents an example of where arson
could arguably be a protectable political offense (assuming
arguendo Aguirre-Aguirre was motivated by more than bus
fares). Despite the difficulty in a case-by-case adjudication of the
political nature of crimes, doing so better ensures that "the
exclusion clauses [are] applied in a restrictive manner" as
prescribed by the Handbook.6"
1. The Political Necessity of a Crime
The Ninth Circuit attempted to limit the manipulability of
the BIA's proportionality test by considering the "political
necessity" of the crime."6 This refinement requires the crime to
be evaluated from the perspective of the alien's home country and
not solely based upon its common-law characteristics." The
Ninth Circuit held that the BIA erred by not considering the
conditions in Guatemala even though there was reason to suspect
the Guatemalan government was murdering its own citizens.7"
'When you are dealing with a government which is an accomplice
or an accessory to terroristic methods of government you need to
use forceful measures to draw the government's attention to your
protest; your political objective is a governmental response, you
65. See id. at 525 (Kleinfeld, J. dissenting) ('The shopkeepers, not their inanimate
inventory, were the victims of having their stores trashed.").
66. See id.
67. McMullen, 788 F.2d at 597 (citing GUY S. GOODWIN-GILL, THE REFUGEE IN
INTERNATIONAL LAw 58-65 (1983)).
68. Handbook, supra note 22, T 180.
69. See Aguirre-Aguirre, 121 F.3d at 524.
70. See id. at 523.
71. See id. at 523. The Guatemalan government "was certainly an accomplice in
such murder by its failure to investigate the homicides and prosecute them." Id.
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look for a sensitive area."" To define a political crime based upon
its common-law characteristics in the host country ignores the
concept that the alien is reacting to his home country's
environment.
Both the Handbook and the INS already rely on home
country conditions. The Handbook admonishes that an
applicant's statements "must be viewed in the context of the
relevant background situation.""2  The INS cites to State
Department Country Reports on Human Rights Practices to
rebut claims of feared persecution. 4 If home country conditions
are relevant to whether an alien can show a clear probability of
persecution, then they must also be relevant to whether his crime
was "political" because persecuted persons are surely more likely
to protest than those who are not persecuted.
Considering the political necessity of a crime, and thereby
the conditions of the country in which it was committed, is
critical because the choice of context (home or host country)
controls the outcome. For example, burning busses in the United
States to protest solely an increase in bus fares is not a political
crime because there are alternative methods available for
influencing the government. However, this crime may be a
political crime when committed in a country where busses are
the primary mode of transportation, the fares comprise the
greatest annual living expense of the citizens, and the
government's motivation for raising the fares was to prevent its
citizens from assembling and protesting its blatant participation
in the illegal killing of innocent citizens.
72. Id. at 524.
73. Handbook, supra note 22, 42. While making these observations, the courts
need not "pass judgment on conditions in the applicant's country of origin." Id. It is not
.appropriate to make qualitative judgments regarding foreign government or a struggle
designed to alter that government" since such judgments are political and are thus "not
within the judicial role." Quinn v. Robinson, 783 F.2d 776, 804 (9th Cir. 1986) (plurality
opinion) (Reinhardt, J.) Cf Statute of the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner
for Refugees, GA Res. 428(V), U.N. SCHR, 5th Sess., ch. 1(2), U.N. Doec. ST/HR (1950)
("The work of the High Commissioner shall be of an entirely non-political character.").
74. See, e.g., Ratnam v. INS, 154 F.3d 990, 993 (9th Cir. 1998). "[Tlhe U.S. State
Department... is the most appropriate and perhaps the best resource the Board could
look to in order to obtain information on political situations in foreign nations." Rojas v.
INS, 937 F.2d 186, 190 n.1 (5th Cir. 1991).
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2. The Fear of Political Tactics and of Politics
Although a host country's relevant concern is criminal
recidivism occurring inside its borders, there are two other fears
that bear on the issue of whether the term "political" should be
defined from the perspective of the home or host country. They
are a fear of the alien's political tactics and a fear of the alien's
politics.
The fear that an alien may bring political tactics to bear in
the host country that were appropriate at home but not in the
host country is allayed by the political necessity requirement
added by the Ninth Circuit. 5 For instance, setting fire to buses
for no other reason than displeasure with the current fare will
not be considered a political crime from the perspective of any
country. This crime is disproportionate to the objective and
consequently falls within the "serious non-political crime"
exception to the withholding remedy. This result cannot be
manipulated by the alien claiming that he or she was motivated
by more than just bus fares because, in addition to subjective
motivation, the conditions in the alien's home country at the time
of the crime are also considered under the Ninth Circuit's
analysis. 6 The question is not simply, "Why did the alien burn
the bus?" The question further asks, "Was the alien's home
country in such a state that burning a bus for this purpose was
politically justified?"
The second fear, affecting whether the political nature of a
crime should be determined from the perspective of the home or
host country, is a fear of the alien's politics. Theoretically, an
individual's politics should not be feared at all in a country that
encourages the free exchange of ideas. Nonetheless, a fear of the
alien's political objectives undeniably exists on some level and
therefore certain crimes, by virtue of their radical objectives, may
be considered non-political even though the crime otherwise
satisfies the political crime standard.
Authority for this unspoken limitation on political motives
may arguably be found in the same article of the Convention that
denies protection to aliens guilty of serious non-political crimes.
Article 1(F)(c) of the Convention provides that the "Convention
75. See Aguirre-Aguirre, 121 F.3d at 524.
76. See id.
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shall not apply to any person with respect to whom there are
serious reasons for considering that he has been guilty of acts
contrary to the purposes and principles of the United Nations.""
According to the Handbook, "[tihere are hardly any precedents on
record for the application of this clause."" One possible
interpretation is that even political crimes are subject to the
remaining exclusionary clauses and therefore must not violate
the purposes and principles of the United Nations. In other
words, a politically motivated crime that is proportionate to its
objective will nonetheless bar an alien from withholding of
deportation if the alien's political motivations violate
"fundamental human rights.
79
Although the Convention's "purposes and principles"
exception is not present in the INA's exceptions to withholding of
deportation, neither is a definition of a political crime. Courts
must therefore look to other sources such as the Convention and
Protocol." Denying protection based upon a fear of an alien's
political ideas may not be statutory or even theoretically sound,
but it may nonetheless underlie judgments of whether a crime is
political. This can only be explained by the reason that aliens
cannot offend the very authority (the host country) that grants
them protection.
Regardless of whether the host country's values may
influence a court's decision, the relevant fear is that the aliens
will repeat their crimes within the host country. Therefore, to
determine whether an alien will repeat an allegedly political
crime requires an understanding of what caused the alien to
commit the crime in the first place. The Ninth Circuit attempted
to clarify that this can only be done from the perspective of the
country in which the crime was committed."'
77. Convention, supra note 23, art. l(F)(c), 606 U.N.T.S. at 268.
78. Handbook, supra note 22, 163.
79. U.N. Charter pmbl., art. 1 para 3.
80. The Ninth Circuit's analysis in McMullen v. INS was rooted in the Convention
and Protocol because the court found the legislative history to be "particularly sparse."
788 F.2d 591, 595 (9th Cir. 1986)
81. See Aguirre-Aguirre, 121 F.3d at 523-24.
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B. The Misunderstood Balancing Test
The balancing test originated out of the United Nation's
attempt to balance the "fundamental rights and freedoms" of
refugees with the "unduly heavy burdens" on host countries from
admitting refugees.82 One of these burdens is "the danger of
admitting a refugee who has committed a serious common
crime."83 The Convention eases this burden by denying both
refugee status and deportation protection "to any person with
respect to whom there are serious reasons for considering that he
has committed a serious non-political crime outside the country
of refuge prior to his admission to that country as a refugee. "
While easing the burden on host countries, the Convention
"also seeks to render due justice to a refugee who has committed
a common crime (or crimes) of a less serious nature."" The
United Nations High Commissioner therefore requires a balance
to be struck "between the nature of the offence ... and the degree
of persecution feared" before all protection is revoked." Thus,
where a non-political crime is minor, or the degree of persecution
feared is great, the host country's fear of admitting criminal
aliens must yield to the humanitarian concerns of the Convention
and Protocol.
Neither the interest of aliens or host countries must yield in
the context of political crimes, however. Aliens who have
committed political crimes in their home countries are not
harbored in the United States because of the lofty goal of valuing
humanitarianism over national security. Rather, these aliens
are allowed to remain in the United States because, unlike
common criminals, they were forced to resort to crime as their
only way of protesting governmental injustices. These criminals
have no reason to repeat their crimes when harbored in the
Untied States. This fine distinction between common and
political crimes is illuminating because it is difficult for a host
country to ever justify protecting aliens guilty of any type of
crime if doing so is viewed as a sacrifice of community safety.
82. Convention, supra note 23, art. 1(A)(2), 606 U.N.T.S. at 268.
83. Handbook, supra note 22, 151.
84. Convention, supra note 23, art. 1(F)(b), 606 U.N.T.S. at 268. See discussion
supra note 91.
85. Handbook, supra note 22, 151.
86. Id. 156.
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The fact that political crimes do not present conflicting
interests, as do common crimes, means that the balancing test
only becomes relevant if the political crime standard is not
satisfied. Only after a crime has been deemed to be a non-
political (or common) crime must the host country chose between
either protecting the alien from persecution or protecting its
citizens from criminal aliens. In making this choice, the
Handbook requires host countries to balance of the severity of the
crime against the degree of persecution the feared by the alien.
In this regard, affirming the Ninth Circuit's reintroduction of the
balancing test would have been a welcome turn towards bringing
federal immigration law into accord with the Convention and
Protocol, to which the United States is signatory.87 Nonetheless,
the point critical to the future development of the political crime
standard is that the balancing test does not apply to political
crimes.
The previous rejections of the balancing test by the BIA,5' the
Ninth Circuit," and the Eleventh Circuit' were not rejections at
all from the perspective of the Convention and Protocol.9 The
balancing test only applies to non-political crimes committed
outside the host country." Both the Convention and the
Handbook make it clear that if an alien commits a particularly
serious crime inside the host country, the host country's concerns
override the humanitarian aspects of refugee law and the host
country may expel the alien without balancing the interests. 3
87. The INA does not provide for the balancing test in the context of the "serious
non-political crime" exception to withholding of deportation. See 8 U.S.C. §
1231(b)(3)(B)(iii) (1998). One writer notes that the Immigration Act of 1990 is also
"inconsistent with the United States' obligations" under the Convention and Protocol
because of "the unavailability.., of any method of balancing the applicant's criminal
conviction against other factors." Abriel, supra note 31, at 29.
88. See In re Rodriguez-Coto, 19 I. & N. Dec. 208 (B.I.A. 1985).
89. See Ramirez-Ramos v. INS, 814 F.2d 1394 (9th Cir. 1987).
90. See Garcia-Mir v. Smith, 766 F.2d 1478 (11th Cir. 1985).
91. One writer asserts that "[iut cannot be strongly argued that the BIA's rejection"
of the balancing test in withholding decisions is wrong because the Handbook only
requires the balancing in determining "whether a person is excluded from refugee status
under Article I(F) of the Convention." See Abriel, supra note 31, at 56. This assertion
does not reconcile with Article I(F) of the Convention that provides that all provisions,
including both the expulsion and refugee status provisions, do not apply to aliens guilty of
serious non-political crimes. See Convention, supra note 23, art. 1(F), 606 U.N.T.S. at
268.
92. See Handbook, supra note 22, 156.
93. See Convention, supra note 23, art. 33(2), 606 U.N.T.S. at 268. Compare
Handbook, supra note 22, 154, with 1 156 (providing a balancing test only for the
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All of the cases where the balancing test was rejected involve
crimes committed inside the United States."4 The over broad
reasoning in these cases, however, led to the rejection of the test
for crimes committed abroad as well. For instance, the BIA's
decision in In re Rodriguez-Coto,"' involved an alien who had
committed armed robbery in California.96 Although the balancing
test never applied to that alien, the BIA reasoned that it must
reject the balancing test otherwise they would "transform a
statutory exclusionary clause into a discretionary
consideration. ,
97
The Ninth Circuit flirted with a limitation on the BIA's
reasoning in Ramirez-Ramos v. INS," a case where an alien was
convicted of selling heroin in California. The court properly
recognized that the balancing does not apply to "a final conviction
of a serious crime in the United States" as it does "where there is
reason to believe an alien committed a crime outside the Untied
States."" The court, however, immediately returned to the BIA's
overly broad analysis and rejected the balancing test on the
additional ground that "Congress already struck the balance
when it phrased the exception to withholding eligibility in
mandatory rather than discretionary language." ° Contrary to
the courts reasoning, only the withholding remedy is phrased in
mandatory language.' The exceptions have always been subject
to a determination by the Attorney General."2
Underlying the BIA's use of a grammar cannon to reject the
balancing test may have been concern with granting relief to an
exception for crimes committed outside the host country).
94. See In re Rodriguez-Coto, 19 I. & N. Dec. 208 n.1 (B.I.A. 1985) (alien was
convicted of armed robbery in California); Ramirez-Ramos v. INS, 814 F.2d 1394, 1395
(9th Cir. 1987) (alien was convicted of selling heroin in California).
95. 19 I. & N. Dec. 208 (B.I.A. 1985).
96. See id. at 208 n.1.
97. Id.
98. 814 F.2d 1394, 1398 (9th Cir. 1987).
99. Id.
100. Id.
101. See Immigration and Nationality Act § 243(h)(2), 8 U.S.C. § 1253(h)(2) (repealed
1996) ("The Attorney General shall not deport any alien... "). In 1996, language having
the similar effect was substituted. See Immigration and Nationality Act § 241(b)(3)(A), 8
U.S.C. § 1231(b)(3)(A) (1998) ("the Attorney General may not remove an alien...").
102. See Immigration and Nationality Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1253(h)(2) (repealed 1996) (the
exceptions shall not apply "if the Attorney General determines that... ") (emphasis
added); Immigration and Nationality Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1231(b)(3)(B) (1998) (the exceptions
do not apply "if the Attorney General decides that.. .") (emphasis added).
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alien who had committed a crime inside the United States. This
explains why the BIA was willing to entertain the balancing test
in two cases prior to Rodriguez-Coto, both of which involved
crimes committed abroad.' Being that the Convention and
Protocol already provide for the BIA's desired result, a more
substantive reason for rejecting the balancing test would have
been to construe United States refugee law in accordance with
these international agreements. Despite this, the BIA's overly
broad textual reasoning in Rodriguez-Coto led it to state that
balancing test would also be rejected in cases involving serious
non-political crimes committed abroad.0 ' The Supreme Court
has since held that the legislative history of the 1980 Refugee Act
indicates "that one of Congress' primary purposes was to bring
United States refugee law into conformance with the 1967 United
Nations Protocol,"00 therefore, the BIA should reconsider its
position on the balancing test in light of its proper application.
IV. CONCLUSION
Although Supreme Court reversed Aguirre-Aguirre based on
principles of Chevron deference,' the Ninth Circuit's detailing of
the BIA's political crime standard can offer guidance for future
development of the political crime standard for the serious non-
political crime exception to withholding of deportation. This
guidance will hopefully assist in bringing federal refugee law into
accord with the Convention, Protocol, and UNHCR with whom
the United States agreed to cooperate.
New issues will continue to arise in determining what crimes
are protectable political offenses because in so doing "[wie seek to
impose on other nations and cultures our own traditional notions
103. See In re Rodriguez-Palma, 17 I. & N. Dec. 465, 466 (B.I.A. 1980) ('applicant
admitted that he had been arrested and convicted in Cuba on three occasions"); In re
Ballester-Garcia, 17 1. & N. Dec. 592 (B.I.A. 1980) ("applicant admitted that he had been
convicted in Cuba"). Unfortunately, the BIA did not have the opportunity to accept the
test in either case because the nature of the offense alone satisfied the serious
requirement and outweighed the probable persecution. See Rodriguez-Palma, 17 I. & N.
Dec. at 469; Ballester-Garcia, 17 1. & N. Dec. at 596.
104. See In re Rodriguez-Coto, 19 I. & N. Dec. 208, 209 (B.I.A. 1985).
105. INS v. Cardoza-Fonseca, 480 U.S. 421, 436-37 (1987). The BIA also recognized
"that Congress' intent.., was simply to adopt, almost verbatim, the United Nations 1951
Convention and 1967 Protocol." In re McMullen, 17 I. & N. Dec. 542, 545 (B.I.A. 1980).
106. See INS v. Aguirre-Aguirre, 119 S.Ct. 1439, 1445 (1999).
107. See discussion supra Parts II.B.1-2.
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of how international political struggles should be conducted." °8
For example, how will we handle a political crime against
democracy?' 9 To the extent that fundamental human rights are
negatively affected, the answer may be that the Convention does
not apply to people guilty of acts contrary to the purposes and
principles of the United Nations."0 Assuming human rights are
not affected however, this provision is not necessarily a solution
because the United Nations does not comprise only democratic
nations.
With the relevant concern of a host country being criminal
recidivism, analyzing a crime from the home country perspective
is the best approach for handling such difficult issues without
imposing the values of our culture on other countries. If the
relevant concern under the proportionality inquiry is the
likelihood of criminal aliens repeating their crimes in the United
States, then it can be said that an alien guilty of a political crime
against democracy is likely to repeat his crime in a democratic
host country and therefore should be excluded.
The refugee problem is a global problem and closing the
borders is not a solution. Federal refugee law should capitalize
on those instances where fundamental human rights can be
protected without threat to the country's populace. The Ninth
Circuit's Aguirre-Aguirre decision offers refinements for
determining those instances.
CHAD ALAN EARNST*
108. Quinn v. Robinson, 783 F.2d 776, 804 (9th Cir. 1986) (plurality opinion)
(Reinhardt, J.).
109. One may ask why a person guilty of a political crime against democracy would
be applying for withholding of deportation to remain in the United States? Conceivably,
an alien could be persecuted for his anti-democratic beliefs in his home country so
intolerably that he prefers to remain in the United States.
110. See Convention, supra note 23, art. 1(F)(c), 606 U.N.T.S. at 268.
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